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A Historical Approach to the New Secular Stagnation Hypothesis 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze the behavior of real interest rates over the long-run using historical 
data for nine developed economies, to assess the extent to which the recent decline observed 
in most advanced countries is at odds with the past data, as suggested by the Secular 
Stagnation hypothesis. By using data from 1703 and performing stationarity and structural 
breaks tests, we find that the recent decline in interest rates is not explained by a structural 
break in the time series. Our results also show that considering long-run data leads to different 
conclusions than using short-run data. 
 





The Secular Stagnation concept was introduced by Alvin Hansen in the late 1930s, with the 
intent to explain the growth stagnation that the United States lived after the Great Depression. 
Hansen (1939) defined Secular Stagnation as a situation where “negative real interest rates 
are needed to equate saving and investment with full employment”. 
By that time, the introduction of the discussion ended up not being as relevant as Hansen 
might have thought, as the real interest rates rose sharply in the following years. More 
recently, in 2013, Larry Summers has brought back the discussion, reintroducing the concept 
as a “decline in the full employment real interest rate with low inflation, which can prevent 
the attainment of full employment indefinitely”. Summers focuses his analysis mainly on the 
period since 1985, which can be seen in Figure 1, and argues that “real interest rates in the 


















Figure 1. Real interest rates in the G7 countries since 1985 (Source: see section 2.2) 
The main question brought by the Secular Stagnation discussion is: has the natural real 
interest rate declined recently to negative levels, compromising the convergence of the actual 
rate to the natural, in a context of near zero inflation? The main worry is that if the natural 
interest rate goes below zero, it may be impossible to clear the market for loanable funds, 
dooming the economy to a persistent unemployment. It has therefore been inferred (Krugman 
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2014) that macroeconomic policy as currently structured may have difficulty maintaining 
production at potential level. 
The discussion has become particularly relevant again in recent years because of the real 
interest rates behavior since the Great Recession. As seen in Figure 1, these have generally 
declined since 2008, in a way that several influential economists (Summers 2014, Williams 
2015, Hamilton et al. 2015, Krugman 2014, Gordon 2014, Blanchard et al. 2014, Crafts 2014, 
Glaeser 2014, Wolff 2014, Caballero et al. 2014, Jimeno et al. 2014) are now discussing 
whether this fall should be considered relevant in a long term perspective – hence Secular 
Stagnation – or if it might only be a phenomenon of cyclical nature. 
The first possibility is addressed by John C. Williams (2015), who, based on his dataset from 
1961, argues that “the fact that rates have been very low for close to seven years implies that 
standard statistical methods indicate that the fall in real rates is entirely due to a downward 
shift in trend” and “longer-term interest rates will be lower on average”, with “no sign of a 
return to a more normal trend”. In contrast, based on Forecasting and Structural Break tests 
in their data from 1800, Hamilton et al. (2015) are more skeptical of this new Secular 
Stagnation hypothesis, saying that there is “little evidence that the real interest rate will revert 
to a neutral value”.  
In the context of this discussion, we intend to study real interest rates in a very long term 
perspective for nine countries, using data starting between 1703 (for the UK) and 1922 (for 
Japan), so that we may investigate if the Great Recession is a structural break in the series 
using different samples within our range, that is, enlarging the window successively, and 
look for previous episodes that may relate to or even have greater importance than the recent 
one. If so, the recent behavior of real rates might not be as relevant as Secular Stagnation 
hypothesis supporters suggest. We should notice that historical series, as the ones used for 
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this study, bring a new perspective to the discussion, as they are based on a larger information 
set, providing more evidence of the past and therefore more robustness to our analysis. 
Namely, our work addresses the following questions: Is the recent real rates decrease a 
significant break in our long-run series? What if we use shorter datasets? Will interest rates 
be permanently lower? 
Therefore, to give reasoned answers to these questions, the data – explained in section 2.2 – 
is subject to two types of analysis: descriptive, in section 2.3, and empirical, in section 3. The 
empirical analysis includes testing for stationarity (3.1); testing for structural breaks (3.2); 
testing for a specific Great Recession structural break (3.3); comparing forecasts for the post-
2007 period with what happened (3.4) and forecasting for future years up to 2020 (3.5). 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Background 
Figure 2 provides information for the U.S. real interest rate (in blue) and the U.S. 
unemployment rate (in red) for three different samples: 1985-2013, as in Summers (2014); 
1961-2013, as done by Williams (2015); and 1900-2013. The real interest rate average for 
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Figure 2. U.S. Real Interest Rate (blue) and Unemployment Rate (red), 1900-2013 
(Sources: FRED; see section 2.2) 
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Looking only at the first sample, since 1985, we may say that the Great Recession (2007-
2008) might be considered a break in the series. But moving on to the second one, since 1961, 
we see that the break does not look so relevant anymore, specially comparing to the increase 
around 1979, when the U.S. conducted aggressive monetary policy in response to the second 
petroleum shock, which can also be observed by the unemployment behavior at the time. So 
we decided to look into the greater picture: since 1900, there are lots of breaks like the one 
in 1979 or more obvious ones like the shift in rates after the Great Depression (1929-1933), 
which makes this post-Great Recession behavior look particularly different from past 
episodes. 
After noticing that the relevance of the recent interest rates decrease changes depending on 
the time span considered, this brief graphical analysis was the motivation that led us to 
consider historical series for our study. 
2.2. Data 
As mentioned before, the collection of data for this study was a crucial point. We started by 
stating that the series would have an annual frequency and would start as early as we could 
find for each country. Consequently, the goal was to do an exhaustive gathering of data from 
many different sources, in order to construct long term time series of real interest rates for 
nine different countries: United Kingdom, United States, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Italy and Portugal. These countries were chosen for being considered good 
representatives of the joint developed countries economic behavior, by including the Group 
of 7 (G7), plus Portugal and the Netherlands. 
For that purpose, we have constructed the series one by one using data for: 
 Nominal interest rate: mainly the Long Term Government Bond Yield, which is usually 
the 10 Year Government Bond Yield. We have chosen this specific yield because it is 
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considered to be the most representative of general interest rates fluctuations and it 
represents financial markets reality in a broad perspective. In some cases, mostly 
concerning the earlier observations, the considered yield does not correspond to a Long 
Term Government Bond Yield as we are used to define it, but to a yield on British 
Consols, French Rentes, German Prussians, etc. These instruments are also bonds issued 
by the governments, but were issued as perpetual bonds redeemable at the option of the 
government. To test if these yields are representative of the general interest rate trend, we 
have computed the correlations between these rates and the respective long term 
government bond yields in the common observations, and the lower correlation we got 
was 76.6%.1 Therefore, we assume these rates to be representative of generic long term 
interest rates and adequate to be used in our long-run interest rate series. 
 Inflation rate: always based on the Consumer Price Index. 





, being rt the country’s ex-ante real interest rate at year t; it the country’s nominal interest 
rate at year t and πt the country’s CPI inflation rate at year t. 
This calculation is based on two assumptions: 
i. The real rate is calculated being the nominal interest rate discounted by the 
expectations of next year’s inflation, πt+1e 
ii. Perfect Forecast: the inflation forecast for next year is considered to be exactly 
correspondent to the value taken by inflation in that same year , πt+1e= πt+1 
                                                          
1 A table with all computed correlations may be found in Appendix I. 
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Therefore, for the calculation of rt, data for nominal interest rates and for inflation rates is 
necessary. The data used to construct the series for the nominal rates, it, was taken from the 
sources identified in Table 1. Graphs for these nine series can be found in Appendix II. 
Table 1. Nominal interest rates data and respective sources 
Country Data Years Source 
United 
Kingdom 
Yield On Consols 1703-1928 Bank of England 
Yield On 10Y Government Bonds 1929-2014 Bank of England 
United States 
Federal Government Bond Yield 
1798-1832, 
1842-1870 
Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1871-1954 Shiller (2000) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1955-2014 FRED 
France 
5% Rentes Yield 1798-1824 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
3% Rentes Yield 1825-1959 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1960-2014 FRED 
Germany 
Prussian State 4s Yield 1815-1843 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Prussian State 3.5s Yield 1844-1868 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Bond Yields Average 1870-1900 Homer, Sylla (2005) 





Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1957-2014 FRED 
Japan 
Loans at Bank of Japan 1883-1947 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1948-1989 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1990-2013 FRED 
Netherlands 
2.5% Perpetual Debt Yield 1814-1959 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1960-2014 FRED 
Portugal 
Rendibilidade dos Bilhetes do Tesouro 1913-1932 Nuno Valério (2001) 
Government Bond Yield 1933-1973 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Rendibilidade das Obrigações do 
Tesouro 
1974-1975 
Banco de Portugal 
Government Bond Yield 1976-1993 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1994-2014 FRED 
Italy 
Official Discount Rate 1894-1923 Banca d’Italia 
3.5s Government Bond Yield 1924-1953 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
5s Government Bond Yield 1954-1969 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1970-1991 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1992-2014 FRED 
Canada 
Province of Ontario Bond Yield 1900-1919 Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Canadian Dollar Bond 
Yield 
1920-1954 
Homer, Sylla (2005) 
Long Term Government Bond Yield 1955-2014 FRED 
9 
 
The different data sources for inflation rates, πt, are identified in Table 2. Again graphs for 
the nine inflation series can be seen in Appendix III. 
Table 2. Inflation data sources 
Country Years Source 
United Kingdom 1703-2014 Bank of England 
United States 
1798-1913 John McCusker (1992) 
1914-2014 U.S. Bureau Labour of Statistics 
France 
1801-1955 Thomas Piketty (2014) 
1956-2014 OECD 
Germany 
1821-1870 International Historical Statistics 
1871-1949 Thomas Piketty (2014) 
1950-2014 German Bundesbank 
Japan 
1923-1947 International Historical Statistics 
1948-2014 Government Statistics for Japan 
Netherlands 
1881-1900 International Historical Statistics 
1901-1960 StatLine Netherlands 
1961-2014 FRED 
Portugal 
1703-1948 Carlos Bastien (2001) 
1949-2014 Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
Italy 
1864-1960 International Historical Statistics 
1961-2014 FRED 
Canada 
1911-1914 International Historical Statistics 
1915-1969 Statistics Canada 
1970-2014 FRED 
In relation to the construction of the series, we had two issues: 
 Missing data: for some years we could not find any data. Those were all for the nominal 
interest rates series and it corresponded to the following years: from 1833 to 1841 for the 
United States; 1869, 1922, 1923, from 1943 to 1947 and from 1953 to 1955 for Germany. 
To solve this issue, we have interpolated our series in the said years, by using an 
algorithm called Cubic Hermite Spline Interpolation, which interpolates the missing 
values by using a third degree polynomial interpolation. The original real interest rates 
series for these countries – US and GER – were then replaced by series with the 
interpolated values – US_IP and GER_IP. 
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 Outliers: a number of outliers can easily be found by analyzing graphically our real 
interest rates series. In order to formally identify these observations, we computed the 
RStudent statistic for every observation and proceeded to use a method of outlier 
detection based on this influence descriptive statistic. Tables with the highest RStudent 
values for each country are in Appendix IV. According to our criteria, which consisted 
in detecting every observation with an absolute value of RStudent higher than 6, this 
statistic has dictated the existence of the following outliers: the real rates for Germany in 
1847 (56.74%) and 1919 (-56.72%); Italy in 1943 (-76.59%); Japan in 1945 (-83.08%) 
and the United Kingdom in 1711 (45.29%). All of these are observations that deviate 
from the other observations in a way that they might be generated by a different 
mechanism than the normal real interest rate trend, which is what we are aiming to study. 
Despite this, we should look at the historical context of these observations: all correspond 
to specific periods in the history of the countries when the inflation had an abrupt 
movement – because of post-war hyperinflation (Germany 1919; Italy 1943; Japan 1945) 
or very negative inflation stemming from economic crises (Germany 1847; United 
Kingdom 1711) – and the national government responded acting as a financial repressor, 
fixing the nominal interest rate. So, the real interest rate also moved abruptly in these 
years. Consequently, we may say that these specific outliers have reasonable 
explanations, which means that they should not be discarded. For these reasons, we 
proceeded to keep these observations in our series. 
2.3. Descriptive Analysis 
Having solved the issues with the data, we are now able to analyze the real interest rate series 























Figure 3. Real interest rate series, all countries, all data (Source: see section 2.2) 
To analyze the real interest rates historically, we also computed some descriptive statistics: 
Table 3. Real interest rate series descriptive statistics 
Country CAN FRA GER ITA JAP NLD POR UK US 
First Year 1910 1801 1821 1894 1922 1880 1913 1703 1798 
Observations 104 213 193 120 92 134 101 311 216 
Average 2.61 1.87 2.39 0.10 -0.18 2.38 1.63 3.10 4.57 
Median 2.63 2.68 3.38 2.72 1.92 2.38 2.70 2.62 3.41 
Standard 
Deviation 
4.67 9.39 9.83 12.42 13.42 4.85 10.69 7.41 7.79 
Maximum 20.58 31.53 56.74 40.91 23.48 21.89 25.04 45.29 38.69 
Maximum 
(year) 
1920 1817 1847 1929 1929 1920 1947 1711 1839 
Minimum -10.85 -34.44 -56.72 -76.59 -83.08 -12.65 -42.08 -21.73 -15.31 
Minimum 
(Year) 
1916 1947 1919 1943 1945 1917 1917 1799 1863 
Amplitude 31.43 65.97 113.46 117.50 106.56 34.54 67.12 67.02 54.00 
We can take several conclusions from Table 3. Firstly, if the series is level stationary (see 
section 3.1), the long-run trend for each country’s real interest rate might be measured by the 
respective series average, presented in the table. The volatility might be measured by the 
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standard deviation, being its nine countries average 8.94%. The countries that exhibit the 
higher volatility are Italy and Japan. 
We can also infer from Figure 3 and Table 3 that the farthest points from the long-run 
tendency correspond to the periods of war or post-war, being the most obvious WWI (1914-
1918) and WWII (1939-1945), which can clearly be seen as the two negative spikes in Figure 
2. As stated in Table 3, these two events cover almost every country’s minimum real rates. 
This can easily be explained by the post-war hyperinflation phenomenon, mentioned earlier. 
Furthermore, considering only G7 countries and the years when all these have data (1922-
2013), the correlations between the seven series vary from 43.61% (UK and Italy) to 87,23% 
(Canada and US), which is suggestive of interdependence.2 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we perform econometrical analysis on our long-run real interest rate series, in 
order to answer to our previously raised questions. 
3.1. Stationarity 
First of all, with the intent of better understanding the long-run behavior of our series, the 
first property to test for in each of our nine series is stationarity. Therefore, four different 
types of unit root tests – Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) and ADF with a breakpoint – were performed 
for each country series (when needed, the AR specification for each series is automatically 
generated according to the Schwarz criterion). The respective test results are displayed in 
Table 4, which reject the presence of unit root at a 1% significance level for all nine countries. 
All these tests are testing for level stationarity and were performed with drift and no trend. 
                                                          
2 The correlation matrix is presented in Appendix V. 
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This means that there is statistical evidence that the mean and the variance of each series do 
not change over time and each long-run real rate behavior does not follow any trend, cycle 
or random walk process. 
Table 4. Results for the Unit Root Tests, all countries, all data 
Test CAN FRA GER ITA JAP NLD POR UK US 
ADF a 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
PP b 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
KPSS c 0.0985 0.4929 0.0958 0.1210 0.1269 0.1199 0.4784 0.4723 0.6888 
ADF w/ Break d <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
a: Mac-Kinnon (1996) one-sided p-value; Null Hypothesis: the series has a unit root 
b: Mac-Kinnon (1996) one-sided p-value; Null Hypothesis: the series has a unit root 
c: KPSS test statistic (1% critical value: 0.739); Null Hypothesis: the series is stationary 
d: Vogelsang (1993) asymptotic one-sided p-value; Null Hypothesis: the series has a unit root 
 
Having these conclusions, modeling and forecasting our series will provide consistent and 
reliable results. Also, knowing that all series are mean-reverting processes – the expectation 
is for each series to return to its mean at some point – and comparing the respective averages 
to the most recent values, the expectation is for rates to go up at some point in the future, as 
most of them (with the exceptions of Italy and Portugal) are currently below the average. 
3.2. Structural Breaks 
Our main focus is to ascertain whether the recent decline in rates is a significant break in 
each country’s series. To achieve that, we performed Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally 
determined breaks – with a maximum of 5 possible breaks –, using three different datasets: 
a) Long-run: All observations gathered (CAN 1910; FRA 1801; GER 1821; ITA 1893; 
JAP 1922; NLD 1880; POR 1913; UK 1703; US 1798); 
b) Medium-run: Every country with data from 1922; 
c) Short-run: Every country with data from 1976. 
The Bai-Perron test results for each country, considering a 5% significance level, are 
summarized in Table 5 for the three datasets. 
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Table 5. Results for the Bai-Perron Tests, all countries, three different datasets 
Country Significant Breaks (All Data) Significant Breaks (1922-2013) Significant Breaks (1976-2013) 
Canada 1925, 1940, 1955, 1982, 1998 1935, 1952, 1965, 1981, 1998 1981, 1986, 1991, 1998, 2009 
France 1833, 1875, 1914, 1952, 1983 1936, 1949, 1962, 1981, 1999 1981, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2009 
Germany No breaks No breaks 1981, 1987, 1998, 2003, 2009 
Italy No breaks No breaks 1981, 1991, 1997, 2002, 2008 
Japan 1936, 1949, 1964, 1977, 1996 1936, 1949, 1964, 1977, 1996 1981, 1987, 1996, 2002, 2009 
Netherlands No breaks 1936, 1951, 1964, 1977, 1998 1981, 1987, 1993, 1998, 2009 
Portugal 1928, 1947, 1964, 1979, 1997 1939, 1952, 1970, 1984, 1997 1984, 1989, 1997, 2003, 2009 
United Kingdom 1895 1936, 1952, 1968, 1981, 2001 1981, 1987, 1998, 2004, 2009 
United States 1843, 1875, 1908, 1940, 1981 No breaks 1981, 1987, 1998, 2003, 2009 
Considering only the long-run dataset, we have constructed graphs with each series and the 
correspondent significant breaks, which are presented in Appendix VI. 
We can take several conclusions from the results presented in Table 5 and from the above 
mentioned graphs, specially regarding the goals of our study:  
i. Looking only at the results from dataset a), the first aspect to notice is the absence of 
any period even remotely close to the Great Recession as a significant break. The 
most recent break is actually 1998, in Canada. 
ii. The second, and most important of all, is the relevance of having different results 
when considering datasets a) and c): in every test considering c), either 2008 or 2009 
is a significant break, which obviously corresponds to the Great Recession. This 
means that different perspectives lead to different conclusions. 
iii. Also, we only need to consider our medium-run data – dataset b) –, to obtain 
interesting results: the most recent significant break obtained is 2001, in the United 
Kingdom, still distant from the Great Recession. 
We may then conclude that the Great Recession only constitutes a significant break when 
considering a shorter time period for our analysis. This means that the recent decrease in real 
rates is not considered a significant movement when considering long or medium-run data. 
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3.3. Great Recession Break 
With the intent to have more robust conclusions for our study, we decided to investigate 
whether the Great Recession specifically could be considered a break. 
Firstly, in order to find the best specifications for modeling each of our country’s series, we 
decided to use the Box-Jenkins methodology. So, we started by obtaining each series’ 
correlogram to observe the behavior of sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions and therefore have some insights about the possible model. Afterwards, we applied 
Eviews add-in ARIMASEL for each series, which estimates every possible ARMA 
specification up to an ARMA (5,5) and calculates the Schwarz Criterion (BIC) for each 
model. The best model for each country corresponds to the one with the lowest BIC value 
and it is explicit in Table 6. 
Having these specifications, we have adapted a simple concept suggested by Hamilton et al. 
(2015), which consisted in introducing in each model a possible shift in the level beginning 
at date t0 (in this case, t0=2007), named δ(t≥t0). δ is a dummy variable which takes the value 
1 if year t is greater or equal to t0 and the value 0 for previous years. Then, we estimate the 
model – with the defined specifications – adding the newly introduced variable, to find out 
if it is statistically significant, that is, if there is a significant break in 2007. 
Table 6. Best model specification and δ significance, all data and 1976-2013 
Country CAN FRA GER_IP ITA JAP NLD POR UK US_IP 
Model AR(1) AR(1) MA(2) AR(1) MA(3) AR(1) ARMA(1,1) MA(1) ARMA(3,2) 
δ p-value 
(all data) 
0.9225 0.9969 0.9838 0.9649 0.9864 0.9359 0.9276 0.9234 0.8798 
δ p-value 
(1976-2013) 
0.7858 0.7339 0.5201 0.884 0.0981 0.6076 0.7621 0.0522 0.0000 
The main conclusion from these results is that, for every country, using all data, the dummy 
introduced is not statistically significant – even at an 85% level –, which suggests again that 
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the Great Recession does not consist of a significant break with this perspective. However, 
if we consider the shorter dataset, 1976-2013, performing the same method now yields δ as 
significant at a 10% level for the UK, the US and Japan, thus showing one more time that the 
Great Recession may only be a significant break when considering short-run data. 
3.4. Forecasting vs. Reality 
For another way of measuring how much of a break in real interest rates series was the Great 
Recession, we have decided to consider a subsample of all data until 2006 and forecast the 
observations from 2007 to 2013 for each country, and then compare these forecasts with the 
actual values. Some conclusions might be taken from this comparison: the closer the forecasts 
get to what happened after 2007, the least of a break exists that year. 
We have used what is called an Automatic ARIMA Forecasting, which chooses a model that 
minimizes the Schwarz Criterion for the subsample considered and produces forecasts for 
the following 7 years, which we have called F_BIC. These forecasts and respective 
comparisons with the real values are represented graphically in Appendix VII. 
To summarize the forecasting accuracy, we computed the forecast error, which is the 
difference between the actual real interest rates and F_BIC, for every country between 2007 
and 2013, which is represented in Figure 4. These differences tell us that, for this period, the 
real rates were generally lower than the forecasts (with the exceptions of Portugal and Italy), 






















Figure 4.  Difference between Reality and Forecasts, all countries, 2007-2013 
In order to measure how much of the decrease was expected, we computed the Mean 
Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) for each country, which is provided in Appendix VIII. It 
indicates that the country with the highest forecasting accuracy was France (62%) and the 
one with the lowest was the UK (10%). The average forecast accuracy was 30%, which 
reflects that the decline was not expected, even if it is not a break in the series. 
3.5. Forecasts up to 2020 
Using the same method as in the previous section, but considering the whole sample 1703-
2013, forecasts for future years 2014-2020 were produced, with the intent of having a new 
insight on whether low real interest rates are going to persist or not. 
These forecasts are represented in Figure 5. We can clearly see that eight of the nine countries 
in our sample have higher forecasted rates in 2020 than the present values. This constitutes 
another piece of evidence for the argument that real interest rates will not decline below the 
average level observed in the past. The only exception to the dominant pattern is Italy, which 
might be explained by the current high value of the yields on Italian Government Bonds, 
































































































































Figure 5. Graphs for 2014-2020 Forecasts, all countries 
5. Conclusion 
In order to take conclusions from our study, we should look back into the questions raised at 
the beginning of our discussion and try to give answers based on our results. 
First of all, the main and most relevant conclusion we may take is that, looking at the data in 
a long-run perspective, since 1703, there is no statistically significant structural break 
corresponding to the Great Recession. Even looking since 1922, there is no break in the series 
at that time. There is a significant break only if we look since 1976. 
This means that, if we take a long-run perspective as the one adopted in this study, the Great 
Recession is not a structural break in real interest rate series and it is, most likely, only a 
cyclical episode. It becomes clear that different conclusions might be taken from different 
information sets; therefore, gathering data as early as 1703 was a crucial point for our work. 
Using the largest information set possible should be a priority, because it gives us more robust 
results and, therefore, more well-founded conclusions. In our case, the conclusion of the 
recent decrease in rates not being a structural break, looking at the longer series, should be a 
result with superior relevance to the result based in the short-run series. 
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These results may be seen as challenging the new Secular Stagnation hypothesis (Summers 
2013), bringing a new perspective – mainly based on historical data – to the discussion. As 
it was observed, the recent behavior is not a permanent stagnation in the real rates series; it 
looks more like one more episode with no statistical significance in the long-run. 
Limitations to our work include the fact that we did not relate our analysis of breaks with the 
real interest rate determinants (Afonso and Rault 2011, Blanchard et al. 2014). The natural 
interest rate concept is also absent, for not being practically measurable. Moreover, the 
current economic paradigm may not be directly comparable to other historical periods in our 
long-run dataset, as distinct centuries have completely different contexts. Our statistical 
analysis is also not perfectly accurate in relation to reality, as it is based on many assumptions. 
Assessing the sensitivity of the results obtained from our statistical techniques when 
gradually changing the time span would be a useful path for further research. 
In relation to monetary policy: even if a lot of interest rates defined by central banks are, at 
the moment, zero or near zero, and therefore we are facing a zero lower bound, this will most 
likely not be a permanent problem, as it has been suggested by some authors (Williams 2015, 
Blanchard et al. 2014). The mean-reverting property of our series tells us that the tendency 
is for rates to go back to their average, which means, today, to increase at some point in the 
near future. This point is also reiterated by our forecasts up to 2020. 
In sum, our results suggest that the recent impact is not permanent and therefore rates will 
eventually return to more normal levels, as we are starting to see, for instance, in the United 
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Appendix I. Correlations between different yields in common years 
Country Years Yields Correlation 
Canada 
1920-1943 Province of Ontario, Long Term Canadian Dollar Bonds 0.984919 
1955-1989 Long Term Canadian Dollar Bonds, Long Term GB 0.998887 
France 
1825-1852 5% Rentes, 3% Rentes 0.937455 
1960-1969 3% Rentes, Long Term GB 0.88593 
Germany 
1853-1868 Prussian 4s, Prussian 3.5s 0.894552 
1870-1883 Prussian 4s, Long Term Bond 0.876101 
1957-1989 High Grade Bond, Long Term GB 0.975877 
Italy 
1924-1949 Official Discount Rate, 3.5s GB 0.766389 
1970-1998 Official Discount Rate, Long Term GB 0.874137 
Japan 
1930-1960 Loans Bank of Japan, Long Term GB 0.920051 
1966-1989 Loans Bank of Japan, Long Term GB 0.894668 
Netherlands 1959-1975 Perpetual Debt, Long Term GB 0.98762 
Portugal 1993-1998 Bilhetes do Tesouro, Long Term GB 0.930705 
United Kingdom 1929-2014 Consols, 10y GB 0.983502 
United States 1871-1899 Federal GB, Long Term GB 0.775833 
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Appendix IV. Highest RStudent values for each country 
CAN FRA GER_IP ITA JAP NLD POR UK US_IP 
Year * Year * Year * Year * Year * Year * Year * Year * Year * 
1920 4.16 1947 4.01 1919 6.68 1943 7.50 1945 8.14 1920 4.29 1917 4.49 1711 6.02 1839 4.59 
1930 3.04 1945 3.78 1847 6.03 1944 4.10 1946 4.17 1921 3.37 1919 4.17 1801 5.57 1838 4.54 
1916 3.00 1946 3.60 1823 4.05 1929 3.45 1947 3.41 1917 3.22 1922 3.37 1799 3.41 1840 4.16 
1947 2.91 1944 3.55 1916 3.33 1942 3.19 1944 2.25 1892 2.77 1920 3.36 1847 3.31 1837 4.10 
1921 2.77 1817 3.24 1918 2.67 1946 3.01 1929 1.79 1944 2.70 1923 2.37 1756 3.03 1836 3.41 
* RStudent absolute value 
Appendix V. Correlation Matrix considering all countries in 1922-2013 
Corr. CAN FRA GER_IP ITA JAP NLD POR UK US_IP 
CAN 1 0.609 0.717 0.399 0.506 0.668 0.177 0.770 0.872 
FRA / 1 0.673 0.623 0.685 0.563 0.292 0.520 0.637 
GER_IP / / 1 0.453 0.769 0.541 0.114 0.495 0.731 
ITA / / / 1 0.466 0.453 0.309 0.436 0.475 
JAP / / / / 1 0.519 0.137 0.466 0.542 
NLD / / / / / 1 0.336 0.772 0.622 
POR / / / / / / 1 0.201 0.344 
UK / / / / / / / 1 0.703 
US_IP / / / / / / / / 1 
24 
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Appendix VIII. Mean Absolute Percentage Error, 2007-2013 
Country CAN FRA GER ITA JAP NLD POR UK US 
MAPE (%) 24.53 62.08 31.95 21.98 31.60 35.41 40.17 9.52 10.57 
 
